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ASPECTS OF 

EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 

SINCE 1878. 



BY 

HENRY D. FUNK, 

Professor of History, Macalester College, 
Saint Paul, Minnesota. 



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D. Of D. 
ilAY i^^ 19 S 



y 



When the Great War now raging in Europe began early last 
August the majority of Americans believed Germany had precipitated 
this conflict. The popular explanation was Germany had built up its 
giant war machine to satisfy the lust of conquest of its war-lord, as 
Emperor William is commonly called. Having derived most of his 
information on current historj^ up to that time from American and 
English sources the author naturally laid most of the blame for the 
war upon Germany's war party and the Kaiser. A little reflection on 
the bitter anti-German tone of the British press for many years past, 
and a consideration of European diplomacy since the overthrow of 
Napoleon, however, raised serious doubts concerning the correctness 
and justice of such an opinion. A closer investigation concerning the 
main facts of European diplomacy since 1878, and examination of the 
official documents of the several countries bearing on the present war, 
have convinced the speaker that his first conclusions were too hastily 
reached and not based on facts. The result of his search for the truth 
relative to the causes of this terrible war are hereby frankly submitted. 

In the main the conclusions are based on the course of European 
diplomacy since 1878, but in several instances reference will be made 
to events of an earlier date in so far as they have bearing on the sub- 
ject under discussion. Before examining the diplomacy of this period, 
it is proper to acquaint ourselves with the national aims of the coun- 
tries involved in the present conflict, since national aspirations deter- 
mine the policies they pursue. 

GERMANY. 

Two impulses have dominated the policy of the German Empire 
since its foundation in the Franco-German war : the Will to realize a 
strong national unity, and the Will to Live. When the imperial 
crown was placed on the brow of William I a- thrill of joy went 
through all the German peoples as they realized that the dream of 
their poets and seers had at last been fulfilled. Barbarossa had come 
forth out of his subterranean castle, the ravens of discord had vanished, 
and a united Germany had become a fact. No longer should it be their 
mission to be the fertilizers of foreign nations, strengthening other 
races by their blood and ideals and skill, but a great and an ever 
greater Fatherland would they establish. 

Their scientific method applied to business produced marvelous 
economic development. Germany became commercially one of the 
foremost nations of the earth. In scholarly activities she continued 
her honorable leadership in the civilized world. But her growth in 
industries, colonial possessions, and in population — gaining 25,000,000 
since the war with France while her Gallic neighbor added only 2,000,- 
000, and Great Britain's gain was about nine per cent.^ — these evidences 
of prosperity aroused the green-eyed yellow monster in her rivals. 
And when the Emperor announced that "Germany's future lies on the 
water" the so-called mistress of the sea saw in this a challenge to her 



supremacy and denied tlie lijrht of the Kaiser to sueli aspiration; 
Great Britain already eonunitted to an anti-(jerman propaganda now 
entered into a league with oilier nations to stop German ascendency. 

GREAT BRITAIN. 

The world gratefully acknowledges England's grand work in 
modeling constitutional government and owes her a debt for many 
benevolent influences. But England's foreign policy has been far from 
purely altruistic. Hir Robert Peel, 1788-1850, twice Prime Minister of 
Great Britain, best expressed the dominant policy of his country in 
these words: "The empire is the fruit of a long, deliberate, persistent 
and conscious effort on the part of our statesmen to avert the pre- 
dominance of any Euroj)ean power." In pursuance of this object 
Britannia successively brought about the overthrow of the political 
supremacy of Spain and France, and of the commercial supremacy of 
Holland. Her method was that of bringing about coalitions and 
alliances as the occasion required and to direct these against her 
rivals, seeing to it that in every instance when peace was made she 
gained the lion's share of the prey. In passing it should be noted that 
during the conflict with France in the Seven Years' War England 
relied on Prussia to do the fighting for her in Europe while she attacked 
France in her colonial possessions. William Pitt was accustomed to 
say that Prussia won England's war in Europe, and the British public 
generally hailed Frederick the Great as the Protestant hero. During 
the Napoleonic wars Great Britain subsidized many of the small Ger- 
man states, Baden, Hanover, Brunswick, Hesse, as also Prussia and 
Austria, and Holland and Russia. She broke the treaty of Amiens 
in 1803 because "peace appeared only to offer an opportunity to 
Napoleon to develop French commerce at their expense."* In 1854-55, 
in consequence of this policy to maintain her supremacy, Great Britain 
allied with France and Piedmont prevented Russia from fulfilling the 
prayer of Gladstone that the unspeakable Turk be kicked out of 
Europe with bag and baggage — because she could not permit Russia 
to gain a commercial advantage by obtaining control of the Dardanelles 
and the Bosphorus. Commercial self-interest prompted her to thwart 
Russia a second time in the attempt to oust the Sultan from Europe 
and to obtain control of the Porte in bringing together a coalition of 
jiowers which forced Russia to give up the treaty of San Stefano 
and submit to the terms dictated by Lord Beaconsfield at the Congress 
of Berlin in 1878. By that treaty Russia was obliged to surrender 
the control she had long sought over the Balkan states. Thessaly and 
the Epirus were handed over to Greece, Bulgaria was made autono- 
mous but tributary to Turkey, Rumania and Servia independent, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Austria was invited to occupy and administer, 
England received Cyprus and guaranteed the integrity of the Sultan's 
possessions in Asia ]Minor. 

From 1878 to 1907 Great Britain consistently pursued an anti- 
Russian policy in order to preserve a balance of power in Europe 
favorable to herself. 

* Robinson & Beard— Outlines of Kiii-opcfiii History, Vol. TI. p. 200. 



FRANCE. 

France has never ceased to long for the glory it had in the days 
of Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte. The wretched miscarriage 
of the attempt by Louis Napoleon to eclipse his great namesake Em- 
peror has only intensified its ambition and deepened French hatred 
for Germany. The demand for revenge for "the lost provinces" care- 
fully kept alive by the war party has been nursed with diligence and 
zeal by her allies. France acting as the banker for Russia has been 
guided by this motive : to use Russia to defeat (lermany. Colonel 
Arthur Boucher voiced the national hope in 1911 in his book : "France 
victorious in the next war," in Avhich he shows Germany can be de^ 
feated if attacked by Russia on one side and by France on the other. 

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

The problem of this comglommerate empire has been to prevent 
dissolution on the one side and to keep Russia from establishing her- 
self in the Balkan states. No other European state has had such a 
vexing and perj)lexing task to settle as has tested the ingenuity of 
her statesmen. Russia has menaced the Dual-empire since its creation, 
and the struggle between these two countries is one of the importaiit 
factors bringing about the present war. 

RUSSIA. 

The arch-disturber in Europe has been "the bear that walks like a 
man." Despite all the crudity of its civilization this Slavic-Mongolian 
people has consistently pursued a grand policy expressed in the wi'l 
of Peter the Great, Czar in 1689-1725. The national objective set 
forth in that document, whether it be the will of Peter or not, Russia 
has striven to realize, as history plainly discloses. Of this remarkable 
document clauses 9, 10 and 11 deserve special attention and are her* 
reproduced : 

"9. Russia must incessantly extend herself toward tlie north, 
along the Baltic Sea, and toward the south along the Black Sea. Our 
kingdom must advance as far as possible toward Constantinople and 
the East Indies. Whoever shall reign there shall be true master of 
the world. Therefore we must excite continual wars, sometimes with 
Turkey, sometimes with Persia; create dockyards on the Black Sea; 
take possession, a little by little, of that sea, as well as of the Baltic, 
which is a point doubly necessary for the success of the project ; we 
must hasten the downfall of Persia ; penetrate as far as the Persian 
Gulf; re-establish, if possible, the ancient commerce of the Levant, 
through Syria, and advance as far as the Indies, which is the Emporium 
of the world. When once there we can do without the cold of Eng- 
laiul." 

"10. Russia must carefully seek and keep up the alliance with 
Austria ; apparently second her design for future dominance over 
Germany; and we must excite underhand her jealousy of the Princes. 
We must excite each and all of these who seek succor from Russia, 



and exercise .a sort of protection over the country, which may prepare 
our future domination. " 

"11. We must interest the House of Austria in the expulsion of 
tlie Turk from Europe, and neutralize her jealousy after the conquest 
of Constantinople, either by excitinu' a war between her and the old 
states of Europe, or by giving up to her part of the conquest, to retake 
it from her afterward." Ballard, in New York Sun. 

That big plan in part has been realized. Already Kussia has 
reached the Pacific, she is pressing into Afghanistan, Thibet, Persia, 
]\roneolia and China. And in the Northwest she has annexed Finland. 
Russia refuses to be checked in her advance. 

In 1901 the St. Petersburg Bourse Gazette, an official organ, de- 
clared: "Russian diplomacy has put an end once for all to the idle 
talk about dividing Persia into a northern sphere of influence belong- 
ing to Russia and a southern sphere belonging to England. There 
can be no division of spheres of influence in Persia, which together 
with the waters which bathe its shores, must remain the object of 
Russian material and moral protection." 

In the spring of this year Professor Delbrueck of Berlin asked 
one of his former Russian students. noAV a teacher of history in Russia, 
why the Russian government and people were so bitterly anti-German. 
The answer frankly and honestly given was: that Russia had become 
convinced that the way from St. Petersburg to Constantinople must 
be via Berlin. 

"Recent revelations of how the war (in the Balkans) came about 
show that the plans that led up to it were formulated in 1908, when 
Russia entered into secret treaty with Servia. directed in the first 
instance against Austria. The exposure began through the publication 
of recriminations among the Bulgarian public men who Avere involved 
in the catastrophe to Bulgarian arms and Bulgarian diplomacy when 
the treaty of Bucharest was signed." R. of Rs. April, 1914, p. 487. 

The Russian Den for December, 1913. charged that Russian diplo- 
macy in admitting the insertion in the treaty of alliance of articles 
directed against Austria-IIuns:ary has assumed the responsibility for 
all the military armaments ]n'Ovoked in Europe by that alliance. The 
fact of the alliance of a million bayonets in the Balkans would not 
have caused the increase of the German military forces if the rumor 
had not got about in diplomatic circles that that alliance had an anti- 
Austrian tendency. 

The London Outlook, for January, 1914, declared : 

"The second Balkan war was the work of Russia. Russia has 
been planning to get a Slav on the Bulgarian throne. . . . The 
Czar is afraid of Bulgarian enlightenment." 

". . . On ]\rarch 12th, in addition to the extremely large regu- 
lar appropriation of $250,000,000 for the army, extraordinary military 
estimates of $60,000,000. an increase of thirty per cent, over 191.3, 
were submitted to the Duma : in addition to this, a loan of $400,000,000 
was secured from the French government "to build strategic railways 
designed to facilitate the concentration of troops on the European and 
Caucasus frontiers. According to the Paris Journal des Debats this 



money was lent by France on the express condition that Russia ' ' should 
render fuller service to the alliance and should take up a firmer atti- 
tude toward Germany." 

This same periodical tells us about the second Balkan war the 
following : 

"Austria was working hard to preserve peace in Rumania and 
keep King Charles quiet — who was forced into war by the Russian 
Czar. Emperor William failed to support Francis Joseph because he 
told the statesmen at Vienna he could not involve Germany in a war 
with Russia." 

EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY AFTER 1878. 

The check to Russian aspirations by the treaty of Berlin provoked 
grim anger of the Bear, tlis growls frightened Anstria-Hungary, who 
looked to Germany for protection and accepted the plan for an alliance 
proposed by Bismarck in 1879. This agreement guaranteed the peace 
of Europe which now entered into a scramble for colonial possessions 
in Africa. 

THE PARTITION OF AFRICA. 

The overthrow of Napoleon in 1815 placed Great Britain in a 
position of overwhelming supremacy as a commercial and colonial 
power. Her statesmen assumed it was their "manifest destiny" to 
control the seas and to determine who should occupy unclaimed lands 
in the dark continent. When France undertook an expedition to 
Algiers iii 1830 Britain resorted to every possible means except war 
to prevent her rival from securing a foothold in Algiers, yielding at 
last because she believed France would fail in the colonizing venture. 
In the war between France and Morocco in 1844 this calm assurance 
was distui'bed, and Great Britain prevented France from obtaining 
fresh territory by conquest in Morocco, and when this state was 
plunged into war with Spain in 1860 British diplomacy secured the 
co-operation of France to avert any territory from falling into the 
Spanish hands. 

The unification of Italy begat in that Power the dream of a world 
empire. Looking across the Mediterranean she longed to assert her 
control over historic Carthage and planned the occupation of Tunis. 
But France blocked that move and sent her troops into this state in 
1881. This disappointment of Italy was one of the chief reasons for 
her entrance into the Triple Alliance in 1883. This alliance has been 
renewed from time to time, in 1887, 1902, 1907 and again in January, 
1914. From 1883 Italy turned her eyes toward Tripoli, the next best 
thing attainable.* 

France asserting her "protectorate" over Tunis in 1881, Britain 
announced her "occupation" of Egypt in 1882 and the same year 
crushed the revolt of the natives. Because the Khedive had plunged 
Egypt into enormous debt to France as well as to herself Great Britain 
consented to a sort of dual control with France from 1879-1883, but 



CooUdge, American Hist. Review, Vol. 17:23. 



after that she made herself the "compulsory adviser" of Egypt, 
ignoring- French claims. Although she has not yet annexed that 
country she is the ruler in fact, if not in law, there. 

The explorations of Livingston, 1840-1873, and of Stanley, 1873- 
1884, enlarged the knowledge of the world about darkest Africa. 

Leopold II of Belgium bore most of the expenses for the explora- 
tions of Stanley from 1879-1884 in the Congo region and consequently 
claimed that territory for Belgium despite protests from Portugal and 
Great Britain. Europe recognized his rights there and the Congo 
Free State became a Belgian colony. England found it hard to forgive 
Leopold for his success, and when the Belgian capitalists abused the 
natives by exacting hard labor in building railroads and draining 
swamps and requiring a certain quantity of rubber each year "the 
British government took care to report the conduct of the Belgian 
officials to the world, and it aroused loud protests in, Europe and 
America ; but those Avho know most aliout African conditions suspect 
that the English had a selfish interest in exaggerating the horrors of 
the situation, with the hope of ultimately extending tlieir own con- 
trol over the Congo regions."* 

Germany also entered on colonial ventures in this era. In 1879 
Bismarck adopted a vigorous industrial and colonial policy to stop 
German emigration and find a market for German manufacturing 
products. By making treaties with African chiefs in 1884 Germany 
acquired four considerable areas amounting to about one million square 
miles in East and West Africa: Togoland, Kamerun, German South- 
west Africa and German East Africa. Germany also obtained a part 
of New Guinea, the Samoan islands, and by purchase from Spain 
the Caroline and Ladrone islands. 

This policy brought Germany into conflict with Great Britain, 
Avhose monopoly in commercial and colonial enterprises were now 
challenged. Emperor William's telegram to Paul Krueger in 1895 con- 
gratulating the Boers upon frustrating Dr. Jameson's raid from 
Rhodesia into the Transvaal, with the purpose of overthrowing the 
Boer government and annexing the diamond fields to England, aroused 
the bitterest feelings in England against the Kaiser. 

Great Britain had leaned in a friendly Avay toward the Triple 
Alliance until Germany became a strenuous competitor. An article in 
the Review of Reviews for April, 1898, by Sidney Whitman, Fellow 
of the Royal Geographic Society, helps us to understand the reasons 
for the estrangement between these kindred peoples: "With regard 
to the English, the sooner they drop the contemptuous railing at 
'things made in Germany,' the sooner they banish the fantastical proj- 
ect — more currently harbored than is generally believed or acknowl- 
edged — of sinking Germany's fleet, bombarding German towns, and 
ruining Germany's commerce, the better for all parties, themselves 
included. In competing with England Germany is only fulfilling her 
national destiny. . . . Germany in many practical matters is al- 
ready ahead, has already left England in the rear." . . . "There 
mav be war, there has ever been war — there will alwavs be war. In 



Robinson & Beard, Outlines of European History- 11, 49C.. 



this case it is also war — the subtlest if not the most cruel — economic 
war. And victory will be to the most disciplined, the most intelligent, 
the most thrifty — shall I add. the most virtuous — the fittest."* 

Soon after the keen observation just quoted was made the South 
African war broke out — October, 1899. The issues of that confliet it 
is not necessarj^ to discuss here. Suffice it to state that while the Boer 
delegates received a rousing welcome in Paris and at The Hague the 
Kaiser refused to grant them audience and opposed the attack of the 
German press against Great Britain by pursuing a pro-British policy. 
Indeed he even offered suggestions to his grandmother, Victoria, rela- 
tive to the kind of military campaign that would ensure victory for 
her armies. After this war Emperor William endeavored faithfully 
and sincerely to maintain cordial relations with Great Britain, but a 
certain element in that country persisted in a campaign of slander 
and misrepresentation. Says Robinson: "English manufacturers and 
merchants have begun to chafe under the competition of Germans, and 
belligerent English publicists insist that the German navy is not 
only a menace to British supremacy on the high seas, but is constructed 
with ulterior designs on Great Britain, "t 

Toward the close of the nineteenth century Great Britain's 
supremacy Avas threatened in several quarters. When France, which 
still had interests in Egypt, raised her flag at Fashoda she almost pre- 
cipitated a war in 1898 and averted it only by ordering Marchand to 
lower the colors in the region he had explored on the Nile. When 
Germany demanded compensation for the murder of two missionaries 
in China and then compelled the lease of Kiao Chau for ninety-nine 
years, thus obtaining the best harbor on the Asiatic coast of China. 
England saw her commercial interests threatened there, and then to 
even up matters established her "protectorate" over Wei-hei-wei in 
the same year, while Russia took Port Arthur. 

ALLIANCE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND JAPAN. 

By this time the competition with Germany had become so serious 
that Great Britain in her isolation after the Boer war felt the need of 
an allv, and that she found in Japan. In 1891 Russia began her Trans- 
Siberian railroad. In 1894 war between China and Japan broke out 
about the question of suzerainty over Korea claimed by both coun- 
tries. "Japan had an interest in extending her claims, as she desired 
larger markets for her products. Friction was frequent between the 
two countries concerning their rights in Korea, as a consequence of 
which Japan began a war in which, with her modern army, she was 
easily victorious over her giant neighbor. The Japanese drove the 
Chinese out of Korea, defeated their navy in the battle of the Yalu. 
invaded IManchuria, where they seized the fortress of Port Arthur, the 
strongest position in eastern Asia, occupied the Liao-tung peninsula 
on which that fortress was located, and prepared to advance toward 
Peking. , , , But in the hour of her triumph Japan was thwarted 



' Tlu» Anierifiin Review of Reviews, April, iSPS, p. 45;i. 
f- Outlines of European History, II, 531. 



10 

I)y a European intervention, and deprived of the fruits of her victory. 
i\ussia induced France and Germany to join her in forcing them 
(tiie Japanese) to give up the most important rewards of their vic- 
tory. . . . These powers were determined that Japan shoukl not 
have Port Arthur, should not have any foot-hold on the continent of 
Asia."* Nippon surrendered to the demands of the three powers. 
While she was nursing her grievances and preparing for a war with 
Russia by increasing her army and navy Great Britain approached 
her with the offer of an alliance. The common enemies of these two 
countries were Russia. France and Germany; they quickly under.stood 
each other and in lf)02 the alliance was formed. 

THE ALLIANX'E BETWEEN GRExVT BRITAIN AND FRANCE. 

Encouraged by Great Britain Japan assumed a firmer attitude 
toward Russia. The Czar had promised to withdraw from Manchuria 
when order was restored, but despite this he kept on increasing his 
military preparations long after quiet and order had been established. 
Japan demanded of Russia the date when her troops would be with- 
drawn from Manchuria, and negotiated about this question from 
August, 1903, to February, 1904. Then because Japan believed "Rus- 
sia Avas merely trying to gain time to tighten her grip on Manchuria 
by elaborate and intentional delay and evasion, and to prolong the 
discussion until she had sufficient troops in the province to be able to 
throw aside the mask, suddenly broke off diplomatic relations and com- 
menced hostilities, "t 

The miserable showing of Russia in the early stages of the war 
gave great concern to France, which had been in alliance with Russia 
since 1891. The balance of poAv.er in Europe Avas upset by this war. 
Great Britain's position and that of Germany was much stronger, but 
that of the Czar much weaker. In view of these facts Delcasse realized 
France could not support two strong hatreds, one against Germany, 
the other against Great Britain. His country believed it needed a 
strong ally against Germany and though that government made friend- 
ly approaches the sentiment of the French people was voiced by 
the Temps in these words: "We can with dignity live on correct 
terms with Germany, but the past forbids us from going further. 
England throughout her history always felt the necessity of a con- 
tinental alliance and continental support. The French army and the 
British navy will be mutually advantageous." Thereupon the alliance 
was formed on the understanding that France should have a free 
hand in ]\Iorocco in return for which she would yield to British 
supremacy in Egypt. This .agreement was signed April 8, 1904. As 
the Russo-Japanese war progressed the Anglo-French entente began to 
carry into operation the terms of the alliance. The process of dis- 
memberment in the Turkish empire had been going on since 1815, 
nevertheless both Egypt and iMorocco were nominally under the rule 
of the Sultan. In 1905 the Kaiser visited the Sultan at Tangiers and 



Hazen, Kurope Since 1815,695. 
Ibid, 7 1. 



11 

declared that he Avoiild enforce the sovereignity of the Snltan and the 
integrity of IMorocco. This intrusion of the Kaiser disturbed the 
equanimity of the two powers that had assumed the right to dispose 
of Morocco in accordance with their interests by a process they called 
"peaceful penetration." Forgetting how Great Britain had intervened 
for Turkey in 1833, 1854, and 1878, her political and religious journals 
poured forth a tirade of abuse against Germany for championing the 
cause of the wicked Mohammedans. But the Kaiser stood his ground 
and in the Algeciras conference, signed April 7, 1906, secured the open- 
door policy for ^Morocco. AVhile this diplomatic encounter was a 
triumph for Germany, its eft'ect was to draw France and Great Britain 
closer together and to intensify their hatred against their chief rival. 
(See Algeciras Conference in last issue of the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica.) 

THE TRIPLE ENTENTE. 

The problem of France and England now was how to check Ger- 
many. This young empire was everywhere in the way. It had prevented 
Great Britain from obtaining the Congo region and it had maintained 
the integrity of Morocco. German trade was increasing enormously 
from year to year, markets formerly altogether under British control 
fell into Germa}! hands, and the Kaiser's population increased at the 
rate of about 8,000,000 each decade. British and French statesmen 
conferred and produced a plan : EdAvard VII, on the throne since 
1901, might undertake a visit to the Czar bearing the good wishes of 
the French cabinet, etc. Perhaps an understanding would be reached. 
The journey was successful; a "gentlemen's agreement" was made in 
1907, and the Entente Cordiale proclaimed to the world. Its object, 
these nations declared, was: (1) to maintain the balance of power: 
(2) to strengthen treaty laws in the interest of peace and the status 
quo; and (3) disarmament. But in each of these particulars the 
Entente has belied its principles. It upset the balance of power, it 
did not work for peace or the status quo, and did not secure dis- 
armament. On the contrary it precipitated an increase of armaments 
at an amazing rate, the Balkan disturbances became more serious at 
once, and treaties became "scraps of paper." 

SOLEMN PLEDGES BROKEN BY ENGLAND AND RUSSIA. 

The first result of the "gentlemen's agreement" between/Great 
Britain and Russia, or Edward VII and the Czar, was the disp^i^r-A--^ 
they made of Persia. That country was divided into a northern sphere 
of influence for Russia and a southern sphere of influence for Great 
Britain. To this end the two powers signed a convention August 31, 
1907, in which they pledged themselves mutually "to respect the 
integrity and independence of Persia." Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the 
British minister in Teheran, writing to the IMinister of Foreign Aiifairs 
for Persia September 4 of the same year, assured him as follows : 
"The object of the two Powers in making this agreement 1° not in 



'y2 

any way to attack, but rather. to assure forever the independence of 
Persia." And Sir Edward Grey, reporting- this convention to the House 
of Commons February 17, 1908, said: "I have used the term 'British 
and Russian spheres.' I trust that it will be noted and understood that 
I have used it solely in the sense in Avhich it is used in this agreement, 
and not in the sense of the political partition of Persia. Under the 
Agreement we bind ourselves not to seek certain concessions of a cer- 
tain kind in certain spheres. But these are only British and Russian 
spheres in a sense which is in no way derogatory to the independence 
and sovereignity of Persia." One passage of this treaty is especially 
significant in the light of subsequent history. "This Agreement be- 
tween the two Powers which have the greatest interests in Persia, 
based as it is on a guarantee of her independence and integrity, can 
only serve to further and promote Persian interests, for henceforth 
Persia aided and- assisted by these tAVO poAverful neighboring states, can 
employ all her poAvers in internal reforms."* 

Believing in the sincerity of these repeated asserA^erations Persia 
began to set her house in order. She asked President Taft to recom- 
mend trustAvorthy Americans to assist in this matter, recognizing the 
good Avork American statesmanship had rendered in reforming China. 
The President complied Avith this request and forAvarded the names of 
several honorable Americans. Among these Avas Morgan Shuster to 
Avhom Avas assigned the difficult task of reorganizing the financial 
system of Persia. He secured as assistant a IMajor Stokes, a former 
officer of the British-Indian army. Then St. Petersburg began to 
bluster about his ai)pointment and Sir EdAvard Grey, AAdio had pre- 
viously given his consent, nOAv afraid of displeasing Britain's good 
friend, Russia, ordered Stokes to resign because the reorganization of 
Persia "Avas in conflict AAath the spirit of the convention of 1907." 
Having secured the removal of Stokes Russia next demanded the dis- 
missal of Shuster. When the Persians refused this a violent encounter 
ensued in Avhicli Persia Avas overcome. A number of executions fol- 
loAved, Shuster Avas sent out of the country, and an indemnity imposed 
on the sub.jected Persians. t The reform party under the paAvs of the 
groAA'ling bear has given up its aspirations for a modern strong and 
independent Persia. 

IMeanAvhile the "nortliAvestern province of Persia has become 
virtually a Russian annex and the Russian Consul. General Orloff, (in 
April, 1914) sent there from Bagdad, Avas received at Tabriz Avith as 
much ceremony as if he Avere a vaceroy. The princes, nobility, and 
15,000 people assembled on the shore of the river Aji to give him 
.rv^^eo^ne and rugs Avere laid for Mr. Orlotf to Avalk upon from his 
carriage to the gala tents, an honor hitherto reserved to the Shah 
alone. t 

Informed and honest Englishmen have blushed and remonstrated 
Avith the Foreign Office for its bafflinu- conduct in Persia. The London 



• The Living Age, Vol. 275, page 111. 

+ Hearst's Magazine, April, 1912, Sinister, Cossaclc Rule in Persi-a. 

1 The Independent, May 11, 1914, p, 243, 



13 

Econoiiiist boldly charged that "Edward Grey's policy has for its end 
the destruction of Persia . . . and that by peaceful penetration 
Persia will soon be a geographical exi)ression." Concluding this jour- 
nal says: "A treaty is a treaty, to the East of Suez as well as to the 
West. Sir Edward Grey has landed the country into grave moral and 
political difficulties, from which he can only extricate us by ridding 
his office of an excessive fear of Russia and an excessive mistrust of 
Germany. ' '* What has puzzled Englishmen about the alliance of their 
country with Russia has seemed less mysterious to observers in other 
nations. The New York Outlook expressed this opinion with remark- 
able clearness, as subsequent events have proved, in its Foreign News 
editorial January 6, 1912, in these words: "If Great Britain is to rely 
for the maintenance of her position in Europe, not upon the potentiality 
of her armed strength, but upon her friendship among nations in 
Europe, the British i)eop]e must be ready to pay the price of those 
friendships, even if the price involves a loss of national self-respect. 
In plain words, if Great Britain is to reckon the friendship of Russia 
among the essential elements of her defense against Germany, she can 
not be too critical of her ally's activities in other directions. Only 
when her naval strength is sufficient so that she is indifferent to any 
threat from Germany will England be safe in running the risk of 
sacrificing the friendship of Russia in the cause of justice to a weak 
people." 

Great Britain has declared that she is in this European war to 
vindicate her honor as a signatory to the treaty of London of 1831 
guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. In announcing this as her 
motive she takes a high moral ground, and offers as a reason for going 
to war a principle that must appeal to her own citizens and to the 
whole world. Unfortunately the proclamations of statesmen can not 
always be taken at their face value. If we are to estimate this explana- 
tion at its true worth we must know how in the past the British govern- 
ment observed her treaties. To do this it is proper that the -searchlight 
of historj' be cast on her still further. We need not tarry to consider 
that she violated the treaty of 1783 with the United States, nor how 
she persisted in kiterfering with the fur trade in the Northwest 
territory and retained the forts she promised to evacuate by the Jay 
treaty of 1794. or how she impressed American seamen until the war 
of 1812. Nor is it necessary to give much space to an account of the 
Oregon dispute and the violation of American neutrality in the Civil 
war — suffice it to show how Great Britain has regarded her treaty 
obligations since 1907, under the direction of the present Foreign OfP^^e 
Secretary. The Persian affair we have disposed of. In the Baltic s!o-a, 
off the coast of Finland, are the Aland Islands. In 1856 a treaty was 
signed by Russia, France and Great Britain together with other Powers, 
providing that the Aland Islands shall not be fortified and no naval 
force be established there. But in 1908 the Russian Duma appropriated 
a large sum of money to fortify this island. Sweden at once protested 
to the government at St. Petersburg, and when Russia in her charac- 



* Living Age, Vol. '21^, p. Ml. 



14 

teiistlc way ignored Sweden tliis country made representations to 
Great Britain and France, the two allies of Russia. Both ignored 
Sweden's appeal. And yet how different had been the British attitude 
in 1829? Sweden ceded Finland and the Aland Islands to Russia in 
1809. Twenty years later when Russia undertook to fortify the island. 
Great Britain at once objected, and a few years later the British tieet 
destroj^ed the fort. After Edward VII had come to an understanding- 
with the Czar England allows Russia to keep a fort on the same island 
despite the fact that she had signed a treaty forbidding the erection 
of fortifications there. 

Again let us note that the Algecira Conference recognized only 
"spheres of influence and economic interests" in IMorocco. But by 
means of "peaceful penetration" France extended her control over 
districts in Morocco until she finally secured a military occupation of 
Fez. When German economic interests suffered in consequence of the 
revolt that followed the Kaiser announced that if Great Britain and 
France persisted in ignoring the provisions of their agreement of 1906 
Germany would be obliged to do so too and seize territory in ^Morocco. 
This threat brought the members of the Anglo-French entente to time. 
After many diplomatic encounters these two Powers succeeded in 
persuading Germany to give up this demand by yielding to her a vast 
amount of territory of doubtful value on the Congo. 

THE ATTITUDE OF GREAT BRITAIN DURING THE MOROCCO 

APFAIR. 

British opinion was not altogether satisfied with this arrangement 
with Germany. The Contemporary Review complained: "France is 
dangerously peace-smitten. She is eager for peace at almost any price. 
She looks at the alternative through the eyes of the late M. Rouvie'r or 
of M. Clemenceau, which magnify the risks of war a hundredfold and 
the evils of Avar a thousand fold. "When the Bosnian crisis was nearing 
its turning point and France had to consider her position earnestly, 
M. Clemenceau summed it all up in a few epigrammatic sentences, 
which dealt with both possible issues of war, and found a bottomless 
abyss at the end of each. . . . Come what may France must avert 
war." This ultra-pacific attitude the editor of the Contemporary 
Review deplored because it was "certain to embolden Germany to 
make greater demands from France," and he concludes by insisting, 
there should be no conversations between France and Germany from 
which Great Britain will be excluded. "Germany's present scheme 
-: — . is to discuss the matter thoroughly with France, not merely 
frankly or amicably, but quite fraternally, and form an alliance with 
France. ... In virtue of this alliance Germany would guarantee 
to France her present possessions, hold out a promise of others, and then 
authoritatively cry halt to the advance of Anglo-Saxondora. Germany's 
aim to fraternize with England and France is in the hope of stepping 
into their colonial shoes. . . . The friendlier we are with Germany 
the greater will be her demands on our altruism.''* 



Contem. Rcvit-w, Vol. 100, p 2,5(5 ff. 



15 

Another writer admits the anti-German policy of the Foreign Office 
thus: "We kept Germany out of Asia Minor and out of Morocco. 
Indirectly through the rise of Japan, we checked her ambition in 
China. ... On the whole then we have succeeded in our game, 
. . . But we hav-e not succeeded in maintaining the integrity of 
Persia by our resistance to the Bagdad railway. "We have had to give 
the game into Russia's hands to secure her doubtful assistance against 
Germany. . . . The action of France in Morocco was a clear 
breach of the Algecira Agreement, and Great Britain had recently 
treated with almost pedantic rigor the setting aside by Austria of that 
far more obsolete document the Treaty of Berlin. Surely the more 
natural and dignified part would have been to come forward as an 
intermediary — to have told Germany that we desired nothing but 
justice and the maintenance of agreements, and that we would as a 
friend plead with France for a prompt recognition of compensation 
claims. Simultaneously the Foreign Office Secretary should have 
informed the French government that we would support her against 
any attempt to take advantage of her military action in Morocco, but 
that we thought Germany had a case which merited prompt attention 
and a just settlement. The settlement came, but it was no thanks to 
Sir Edward Grey that war did not come first. "^ 

Another article from the pen of E. D. Morel throws additional 
light on the Morocco diplomacy. France again and again denied with 
the most solemn asseverations that it entertained any notion of 
infringing the integrity of Morocco. Yet France had violated this 
agreement. "It was surely infantile to imagine that Germany was 
any more likely in 1911 than she was in 1904-05 to agree to France 
securing ]\Iorocco without positive guarantee as to the open door, and 
without paying her bill of compensation even as France had found it 
necessary to pay the British', Spanish and Italian bills. . . . France 
had occupied Fez contrary to the articles of the Algecira conference. 
. . . And in the face of this, British diplomacy has persistently 
accused the German government of having re-opened the Morocco ques- 
tion in sending a gunboat to Agadir. An astounding story, in truth ! 
When will the bandages fall from the eyes of the British public, one 
wonders ! What millions already spent in war preparations, what mil- 
lions yet to be expended would not have been saved the peoples of 
Britain, France and Germany if British diplomacy had been conscious 
of its power and its responsibilities, and above all its opportunities I"^ 

"The indiscretions of 1905 in regard to plans for seizing the Kiel 
Canal and the landing of 100,000 British troops in Schleswig-Holstein 
were followed by the cry for more ships. So the indiscretions of 1911 
as to the mobilization of the British fleet and the landing of 150,000 
British troops in Belgium have had the same results. The Germans 
feel themselves menaced." 

In defence of the Foreign Office Philippe Millet ventured this 
assertion: "By expressing, at the most critical moment England's 
will, not only to stand by France, but before all to defend British 

1 Nineteenth Century, Vol. 71, 227-8. 
2Ibid, Vol. 71,233-251. 



16 

interests in Morocco, Sir Edward Grey has certainly done more to 
streno'then the peace of Europe than if he had listened to the peace- 
crank-open-air preachers Avho are trying to ruin England for the bene- 
fit of humanity ... in the name of democratic principles.""' 

The instances cited show that twice the British Foreign Office 
consented to the violation of treaties by Russia and once by France. 
In view of these facts what value shall we attach to the statement 
Great Britain had entered this war to preserve the sanctity of inter- 
national treaties? 

That the Balkan war was precipitated through the intrigues of 
Russia is so generally accepted by all writers whether British, German. 
French or American that it is not necessary to devote time to it here. 
The outcome of the second Balkan war, however, was such that Servia 's 
territory was almost doubled. In consequence of this Europe was pre- 
pared to see an end to the old order of things at almost any moment. 
Since Octol)er, 1908, the Balkan region had been in a ferment. On 
October 3rd of that year Francis Joseph announced his decision to 
incorporate Bosnia and Herzegovina within his empire. Two days 
later Bulgaria proclaimed its complete independence of Turkey and 
declared itself a kingdom. On the 7th Crete repudiated all connection 
with Turkey and declared for union with Greece. The events of 1908 
to 1913 upset the balance of power in Europe, but not in favor of the 
Triple Alliance. In March, 1909, Servia had pledged herself to the 
PoAve'rs "to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria- 
Hungary and to live in the future on good neighborly terms with the 
latter " But she did not keep her promise. Anti-Austrian agitations 
among her subjects culminated in the assassination of Franz Ferdi- 
nand. June 28th, 1914. After that fatal date Servia did nothing what- 
ever to express regret for, or undertake an investigation of. the con- 
spiracy which had caused the murder. Then on the 23rd of July the 
Austro-Hungarian government addressed a formidable note to Servia 
and in ten days Europe w^as plunged into a big war. 

Now as to that note. Sir M. Bunsen charges that Germany knew its 
contents before it was issued, but he furnishes no proof for this con- 
tention, W'hile Germany denies that it had previous knowledge thereof. 
The most that can be said is that Austria informed Germany it could 
look no "longer at the operations on the other side of the border with- 
out taking action" and that Germany assured Austria she would sup- 
port her in "any action she might consider it necessary to take in 
order to put an end to the movement in Servia against the existence 
of the Austra-Hungarian monarchy." Diplomatic negotiations among 
the Powers began at once with the avoAved purpose of averting a 
general European war. Sir Edward Grey was very active in this 
work, but his record during the twenty-seven years he had been con- 
nected with the Foreign Office now proved a great handicap to him. 
He had been so consistently and so bitterly anti-German the represen- 
tatives of Germany and Austria had no confidence in his honesty. 
How could they when they remembered his policies with regard to 
Persia, the Aland Islands, Morocco, etc. 



3 Ibid, Vol.71, 1058. 



17 

He declared the time-limit of the Austrian ultimatum too short, 
and yet he admitted that a time limit had to l)e fixed to prevent the 
affair irom being- dragged out indefinitely. 

Again, from the very first he assured Russia and France, by impli- 
cation at least, so that these two countries understood. Great Britain 
could be' counted on to help them in case war would come, and on the 
other hand he made it clear to Germany that it need not depend on 
Great Britain remaining neutral. 

But striking, indeed, is the confession he makes in document No. 
101 of the British White Papei^: "And I will say this: If the peace 
of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my 
own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany 
could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive 
or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France. 
Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and 
worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and. 
Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly im- 
proved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject 
for definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute 
than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely 
passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow 
may make possible some more definite rapprochment between the 
Powers than has been possible hitherto." What the paragraph shows 
is this : When he had made a friendly advance Germany had recip- 
rocated and the thing to do was to discontinue his anti-German policy. 

In document No. 90 he says: "There must, of course, be some 
humiliation of Servia, but Austria might press things so far as to 
involve the humiliation of Russia." And in No. 17 he declared: "If 
they (Austria) could make war on Servia and at the same time pacify 
Russia, well and good, but if not, the consequences would be incal- 
culable." 

Now here is the key to the situation. Sir Edward Grey in this 
case as in much of his diplomacy since 1907 is too considerate of Russia. 
As he did not restrain Russia in Persia and on the Aland Islands, so he 
failed here, he yielded to St. Petersburg. This is especially apparent 
from the negotiations concerning Russian mobilization. 

As early as July 25 Sir Edward Grey knew that if Russia were 
assured of the support of France she would face all the risks of war. 
That help was promised at once and on the same day Russia decided 
to mobilize, according to documents 17 and Annex 23A in the Official 
Documents published by the International Conciliation. And this was 
three days before Austria declared war against Servia! Sir Edward 
Grey must have known that the mobilization of Russia would precipi- 
tate the war, especially if it mobilized against Germany. In docu-. 
ment 43 he was informed that if Russia mobilized against Germany, 
i. e. in the north, Germany would mobilize, too. The same day the 
British Ambassador informed the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
he "trusted that the Russian Government would defer the mobilization 
ukase for as long as possible and that troops would not be alloAved to 
cross tbe frontier even when it was issued." No. 44. 



18 

Sir Edward Grey knew, too, that Russia under no consideration 
would agree to localize the war, Xo. 56, July 27. On the 28th and 
29th Russian mobilization was in full swing. Nos. 71 and 78. The 
Powers, except Russia, believed Servia should be chastised. Austria 
insisted that this be done by a "punitive occupation of Servian terri- 
tory." Austria guaranteed she would not destroy the "sovereignty," 
the "independence," and the "integrity" of Servia. On the 30th of 
July Sazanof submitted the following formula as a basis of mediation : 
"If Austria, recognizing that her conflict Avith Servia has assumed 
character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to 
eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sover- 
eigntv of Servia, Russia engages to stop all militarv preparations." 
No. 97. 

On July 31 Grey wired Gosclien favorably about Austria getting 
full satisfaction of her demands on Servia "provided that they did 
not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. 
As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her will- 
ingness to respect them. - Russia might be informed by the four Powers 
that the,y would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the 
length of impairing Servian sovereigntj^ and integrity." No. 111. Then 
Sir Edward Grey declared: "If Germany could get any reasonable 
proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria 
were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France 
Avould be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. 
Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia 
and France would not accept it his ^lajesty's Government would have 
nothing to do with the consequences ; but, otherwise, I told German 
Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in." 

^Meanwhile the whole Russian army and fleet were being mobilized, 
and the British began to express fear "that Germany would mobilize," 
July 31, No. 118. At the same time the White Papers admit Germany 
did influence Austria to work for peace. No. 121. and Austria was 
ready to co-operate. 

The way to preserve peace was to stop mobilizing. But Avhen 
Buchanan pressed this matter on Sazanof, he ansAvered : "It Avas, 
however, of course impossible, for reasons explained, to stop a mobili- 
zation Avhieh Avas already in progress. No. 120. 

Russia's game Avas to temporize still more. On August 1 she 
offered a ncAv formula as a basis for discussion betAveen Austria and 
herself, in accordance Avith the English proposal: "If Austria con- 
sents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, 
recognizing that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character 
of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great PoAvers 
may examine the satisfaction Avhich Servia can accord to the Austro- 
Hungarian GoA^ernment Avithout injury to her sovereign rights as a 
State and to her independence, Russia undertakes her Avaiting attitude, 
No. 132. Austria accepted the formula, and Sir EdAvard Grey on this 
same daj^ telegraphed to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg: 
"The understanding of this acceptance Avould naturally be that the 
Austrian military action against Servia Avould continue for the present, 



19 

and \ that the British Government would urge upon Russian Govern- 
ment] to stop the mobilization of troops directed against Austria, in 
whicli case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military 
counf\pr-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by 
Russifin mobilization. You should inform Minister for Foreign Afifairs 
and siiy that if, in consideration of the acceptance of mediation by 
Austri^, Russia can agree to stop mobilization, it appears still to be 
possible to preserve peace," No. 135. 

Now that is exactly the position Germany took. On July 30 she 
had ask^d Russia to stop mobilizing, but then the Czar answered the 
Kaiser, the plan for mobilizing had been made on the 25th, and when 
the Kaiser telegraphed the Czar a second time and demanded Russian 
demobilization, Russia answered "it was technically impossible to do 
so." And then comes the astounding apology for Russia by Sazanof, 
"it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not 
know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was that 
her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed 
until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. . 
The action of the Austro-Iiungarian Government and the Ger- 
man preparations" had forced the Russian Government to order mobili- 
zation, and the mobilization of Germany had created a desperate 
situation . . . (but) In no case would Russia begin hostilities 
first." Nevertheless on that same day Russian troops crossed the 
German frontier. Germany has been criticised for not pushing the 
intervention of the Powers at the beginning of the negotiations. It 
is true she was slow but her answer is not unreasonable. It was a ques- 
tion of propriety. Let Austria and Servia settle their affairs. But 
when Russia threatened to make war, Germany brought pressure on 
Austria to avert war. Germany insisted the trouble could be settled 
between Austria and Servia. It did not believe Russia would actually 
begin war. Nos. 47, 48, and 80, although the possibility existed. Nos. 
80, 86, and 106. 

In view of these facts, that Germany urged Austria to accept 
the Anglo-Russian proposal for mediation and that thi^ formula was 
accepted by Austria, that Grey himself had said: "If Russia can stop 
mobilization it appears still to be possible .to preserve peace," can 
it be said that Grey was true to his own promise that he would not 
support Russia and France if they would not be reasonable in their 
attitude toward mediation? Certainly Russia's action in this affair 
was unjustifiable. On August 1 Grey had the opportunity to avert the 
war if he had demanded of Russia to do what he urged upon her, but 
as in all dealings with Russia known to us since 1907 the British 
Foreign Office was submissive to St. Petersburg. And the war came 
with Great Britain supporting Russia. 

France answered the German inquiry ;as to what she proposed 
to .do if Russia and Germany became involved in a war, by saying 
France would act as she thought her interests required; it was clear 
that she was ready for war. The question then was how to secure 
the neutrality of Great Britain. The endeavor to obtain this the Brit- 
ish government has characterized as an "infamous proposal" and her 



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20 021 546 309 6 



statesmen have appealed to tlie men of England, Scotland, Ireland and 
Wales to enlist in the British army to defend the honor of the govern- 
ment. Now what was it Germany proposed? 1. To comply witli the 
British demand that the German navy should not attack the northern 
coast of France. 2. That Germany would observe the strict neutrality 
of Belgium. 3. That Germany would neither take French continental 
nor French colonial territory ; and, 4. That Germany asked the Brit- 
ish Foreign Office to formulate conditions on which Britain would 
remain neutral. Document No. 123. Now, if we bear in mind that 
Russia precipitated the war by refusing to demobilize and that France 
had pledged her support of Russia, was it an "infamous proposal" for 
Germany to ask Great Britain to remain neutral? 

The German government believed it had sufficient evidence that 
Belgium had violated her neutrality, and "hacked" her way through 
that country. When peace will be made Germany will have to submit 
the evidence for this explanation to the judgment of the world. 

Meantime the enemies of the Kaiser and his people charged them 
with being deliberate disturbers of the world-peace. To substantiate 
this accusation the British publicists and writers have wiped the dust 
from Nietzsche's philosophy and make that the ethics of the German 
people. They cite from Heinrich von Treitschke's History of Germany 
and find there the inspiration for Germany's lust for world conquest: 
and they quote from Bernhardi's "Germany and the Next War," and 
adduce that as proof that Germany wanted the war, had long prepared 
for it and is now following the plans mapped out by that military 
critic. These are very serious charges, and it must be admitted that 
these three authors have caused great embarrassment to Germany and 
her friends. Delbriick said only last winter, Germany's greatest ene- 
mies were the Pan-Germanists. But to prove that Nietzsche, Treit- 
schke and Bernhardi had become the leaders of German thought and 
ambition requires more than a few pages of quotations from the most 
radical statements of these authors. While Germany and her friends 
deny the validity of these imputations, they can do nothing more at 
present than wait and let time pronounce the verdict of "guiltj'" or 
"not guilty." The people of Germany believe they are innocent of the 
grave charges preferred against them and maintain that they desired 
peace. Never before in the history of Europe were all the German 
states and parties so united as today, and at no time was the Kaiser 
so beloved as in this crisis. Even from Alsace and Lorraine the num- 
ber of volunteers to fight for the Fatherland was more than called for. 

The British public, on the other hand, is not so united in the 
support of its government, of many voices raised in protest against 
the policy of the Foreign Office tw^o will be cited here in concluding 
this paper. The Rev. John Clifford, D. D., of London, said: "I can 
not doubt that we ourselves have to a large extent created the circum- 
stances which have made our intervention inevitable," and Bernard 
Shaw declared : "History will not excuse us because after making the 
war inevitable, we run around at the last moment begging everybody 
not to make a disturbance." 






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